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THE ENIGMA OF THE BLIND SALAMANDER AND GROUNDWATER PUMPING:
(—)	
LESSONS FROM THE EDWARDS AQUIFER, TEXAS
By Charles R. Shockey 1
I. Summary
For the past five years, litigation over protection of
endangered and threatened species in the Edwards Aquifer region
of Texas has provided a fascinating case study of why people
either love or hate the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-44. The controversy has grown for 40 years over
competing uses of a limited water resource, which initially began
as a battle over state water rights, then escalated to a full-
blown war over the ESA in 1991. The opening phase of ESA
litigation finally ended on May 17, 1996, but not before a series
of legal detours into the Voting Rights Act, the Department of
(Th	 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Act, state
constitutional law, federalism, abstention, and a variety of
other side shows, including law suits to enjoin a catfish farm.
New 'rounds of ESA litigation have commenced, raising challenges
under sections 4, 7, and 9 of that Act. If 1996 stays as dry as
it has thus far, the new litigation could prove the old Texas
aphorism that "whiskey's for drinking but water's for fighting."
I would like to use the ESA litigation over the Edwards
Aquifer to focus on a rather unusual judicial application of the
section 9 prohibition against the unlawful "take" of a listed
1 This paper represents the personal views, opinions, and
analysis of the author and is not attributable in any way to the
United States or the Department of Justice.
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species, then explore how the Supreme Court's 1995 opinion in the
Sweet Home case might apply to future ESA litigation over pumping
limits and water rights in the Edwards. First, let me provide
some background on the Edwards Aquifer, the ESA-listed species of
concern, and the litigation that has developed to date.
A. The Geographical--Hydrological--Biological Setting
The Edwards Aquifer is an underground aquifer, about 175
miles long, covering 3,600 square miles and underlies parts of 15
counties in South-Central Texas. The aquifer has been designated
as the sole-source aquifer for the City of San Antonio, Texas,
and provides most of the potable water supply for more than 1.5
million people, including the nation's ninth largest city and the
surrounding areas. Historically, Texas, alone among the 50
states, has not regulated withdrawal of underground water. That
policy may, or may not, change as a result of the ESA litigation.
The aquifer generally declines in elevation as the formation
moves from the hills of West Texas to the eastern coastal plain
and the Gulf of Mexico. The exact movement of water through the
limestone and dolomite composition of the aquifer is largely
undefined, but most water in the Edwards accumulates from flows
of surface streams in the recharge zone to the north and west
that feed the aquifer. Water either is pumped from the aquifer
This description of the Edwards Aquifer and its ecosystem
is taken from the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered by the district court in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, No. MO-
91-CA-069 (W.D.Tex. May 26, 1993). The court's original Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued on February 1, 1993, but
superseded by the May 26 amended findings and conclusions, are
published in 36 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533-58.
/Th
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or is discharged eventually at the two of the largest springs in
(—)	 the Southwest, San Marcos Springs in the City of San Marcos,
Texas, and Comal Springs in City of New Braunfels, Texas, which
both are located in the Guadalupe River Basin.
The aquifer itself, with its subterranean caves and caverns,
is home to the mysterious and rather bizarre-looking Texas blind
salamander, an endangered species, while San Marcos and Comal
Springs provide the unique and exclusive habitat for four other
federally listed endangered and threatened species: the fountain
darter, an endangered fish found at both springs; the San Marcos
Gambusia, an endangered fish not seen since 1982 and believed now
to be extinct; the threatened San Marcos salamander, found at San
Marcos Springs; and Texas wild rice, an endangered plant located
in the San Marcos River. Each species, to a significant extent,
depends for its survival upon an adequate and continuous natural
flow of fresh water through the aquifer that exits at the two
springs.
The rates of springf low are influenced by the levels of
water in the Edwards, along with the local aquifer recharge,
especially at San Marcos. The several spring openings at Comal
are located at an elevation of approximately 612 to 619 feet
above mean sea level (msl). If the water level of the aquifer,
as measured by an index reference well in nearby San Antonio,
drops below 619 feet, the springs begin to dry. Once it drops
below 612 feet, the springs stop flowing altogether, as occurred
for two months in July, 1956. At San Marcos, the springs are
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located at a lower elevation of 575 feet msl, where they feed
Spring Lake, home of Ralph, the World-Famous Diving Pig, at
Aquarena Springs. San Marcos Springs has never gone dry in
recorded history. Both springs systems feed adjacent lakes then,
in turn, the Comal and San Marcos Rivers, tributaries to the
Guadalupe and Blanco Rivers, which run southeasterly through
several surface reservoirs and empty into San Antonio Bay near
Victoria, Texas, and the Gulf of Mexico.
Recharge to the aquifer is highly variable, depending on
weather conditions, ranging from a low of 46,000 acre feet per
year (afy) in the driest year to more than 2,000,000 afy in wet
years. To date, 1996 is proving to be one of the two or three
driest years in the 20th Century in terms of rainfall and
recharge to the aquifer.
Water is removed from the Edwards by discharge through
wells, movement between underground formations, or discharge
through springs. Much of the controversy surrounding the Edwards
Aquifer concerns whether water should be withdrawn by pumping for
a variety of competing human uses, including: irrigation for
agriculture, largely in Uvalde and Medina Counties to the West;
withdrawal for municipal, industrial, and military use, primarily
in San Antonio and surrounding Bexar County; or springf low
discharge at San Marcos in Hays County and New Braunfels in Comal
County, where the waters feed into the Guadalupe and Blanco
Rivers and, if not otherwise intercepted, the Gulf of Mexico.
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Pumping from the Edwards has increased dramatically as San
Antonio and surrounding regions have grown, from 30,000 afy near
the turn of the century to more than 500,000 afy in recent years.
In 1956, after a seven-year drought of record, Comal Springs
dried up completely for two months, while San Marcos Springs
recorded its lowest flow of 46 cubic feet per second (cfs). The
minimum average daily from Comal Springs is roughly 200-250 cfs,
while flows at San Marcos average roughly 100-125 cfs, with much
less variably than at Comal.
Pumping from the Edwards prior to 1956 averaged 219,000 afy
and reached 321,000 afy during that year when Comal Springs went
dry. In comparison, pumping during the late 1980s averaged
468,000 afy and reached 540,000 cfy in 1989, when the springflow
at Comal again slowed considerably. Texas has operated under the
unregulated rule of "capture" for groundwater rights for over a
century. While the State of Texas has created a regional agency,
the Edwards Underground Water District, with limited powers to
regulate water quality from the aquifer, the EUWD has lacked the
regulatory authority to prevent anyone from withdrawing water in
unlimited volumes from the aquifer. Attention on the problem of
unregulated pumping was riveted in 1991, when a catfish farm
operator named Ronnie Pucek drilled artesian wells in San Antonio
that flowed at rates equal to about one-third of the entire





When Comal Springs went dry in 1956, the resident population
of fountain darters died. (An earlier population had been
largely decimated in 1951 when State Parks and Wildlife personnel
applied highly toxic rotenone to eliminate resident fish so that
the rivers could be stocked with bass and trout for sport fishing
to support a recreational . fishery). In the late 19705, after
flows at Comal had been restored, a fishery biologist from
Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos reintroduced some
darters from the San Marcos population to the Comal ecosystem.
Since that reintroduction, both populations of fountain darters
have generally stabilized, as the species can be maintained and
bred in captivity without difficulty. FWS sees little chance of
removing them from endangered status, however, without the means
to regulate aquifer withdrawals and ensure continuous springflow
to provide a suitable natural habitat.
The other ESA-listed species have not fared as well, with
the gambusia at San Marcos not observed since 1982 and Texas wild
rice susceptible to damage from predators and recreational tubing
during the increasingly frequent periods of low flow in the San
Marcos River. Little is known about the two salamander species,
neither of which has been bred with any success by FWS in captive
propagation programs. The San Marcos salamander, once thought to
inhabit both aquatic ecosystems, now is believed to exist only at
San Marcos. The underground Texas blind salamander is known to
exist only because individual members of the species sporadically
surface from the aquifer through spring openings or artesian
-6-
wells. By the time they pop to the surface near Spring Lake in
(Th
	
	 San Marcos, they are severed entirely from their natural habitat
and can exist only in captivity as bizarre-looking creatures with
hooded protrusions in place of eye sockets.
The five species have been listed as endangered or
threatened under the ESA since the 1970s. In 1982, under the
authority of ESA 4, FWS designated San Marcos Springs and River
as critical habitat for four of the species, the fountain darter,
San Marcos gambusia, San Marcos salamander, and Texas wild rice.
(The extent of the Texas blind salamander's habitat, being
subterranean, is unknown). Comal Springs was not designated as
critical habitat.
In 1984, FWS adopted a recovery plan for these four species
under section 4(f) of the ESA. The single greatest threat to
these aquatic species was identified as the loss of natural
springflow, resulting primarily from excessive water withdrawals
from the aquifer for human consumption. This threat was
particularly acute because no mechanism has existed under Texas
law to regulate pumping from an underground aquifer--the rule of
"capture" still prevailed under state law. The FWS recovery plan
called upon water users to develop a region-wide plan to restrict
pumping, but did not specify either minimum springf lows or
aquifer levels that FWS felt must be maintained to protect the
species. Other threats to the species identified in the recovery
plan included predation and contamination of the springs and
river habitat from surface pollution. An additional concern that
-7-
later emerged from overdrafting of the aquifer was the prospect
of hydrogen sulfide intruding into the aquifer across a "bad-
water line" located on a geologic fault near the two springs.
This threat becomes most pronounced during times of low flows in
the aquifer and springs.
In 1984, 1989, and 1990, as little rain fell in the region,
the population continued to grow and pumping increased, causing
springf lows dropped significantly and posing a threat to the five
listed species. In 1989, the Sierra Club and the Guadalupe-
Blanco River Authority (GBRA) sent notices of intent to sue under
ESA § 11(g) to 40 different federal agencies and 950 individual
pumpers, including the largest single pumper, the City of San
Antonio. The Sierra Club and GBRA alleged that overdrafting of
the aquifer compelled consultation by each federal agency under
ESA § 7 regarding the impact of federal programs on the species
and also alleged violations of the ESA § 9 prohibition against
"take" of a listed wildlife species. They further alleged that
FWS had not properly adopted and implemented recovery plans for
the species under ESA §s 4(f).
Rains fortuitously preserved the springf low and aquifer
levels in 1989 and 1990. In May, 1991, however, the Sierra Club
and GBRA filed suit in Midland, Texas, 300 miles to the West of
San Antonio. They alleged that FWS, and FWS alone, had violated
ESA § 4 by failing to implement the recovery plan and ESA 9 by
causing a "take" of listed species. No ESA § 7 claim was pled,
nor was any pumper alleged to have "taken" a listed species. Why
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GBRA, which had opposed the designation of critical habitat ten
years earlier? If water is not pumped by the farmers in the West
of by San Antonio, it flows through the springs and feeds the
Guadalupe and Blanco Rivers, where it is captured by GBRA for
sale back to . . . San Antonio.
A dozen parties moved to intervene, including the Cities of
San Marcos and New Braunfels and several smaller water districts
as plaintiffs, while the City of San Antonio, major industrial
pumpers, and several farmers intervened as defendants. The State
of Texas sought to do join the fray on both sides on behalf of
three separate state agencies, but the court aligned the State as
only a defendant.
After a four-day bench trial in November, 1992, the court
(Hon. Lucius D. Bunton, III) entered judgment for the plaintiffs
(Th on February 1, 1993, holding that FWS in fact had violated both
ESA § 4 by failing to implement its recovery plan and ESA § 9 by
causing the "take" of the listed species. How exactly did FWS
inflict this "harm" on the species? By failing to inform the
public of the minimum springf lows required to protect the
species. Presumably, once the people of Texas were informed by
the Federal Government of the needs of the endangered fish and
salamanders, they would trip over one another in their rush to
turn off the pumps, stop their excessive withdrawals from the
aquifer, and agree to flush only when absolutely necessary.
While the judgment was entered against FWS, the court rather
paradoxically also found that "fountain darters are 'taken'
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(within the meaning of 16 U.S.C. 	 1538(a) (1) (B)," not due to FWS
malfeasance, but "as a result of withdrawals from the Edwards
Aquifer, whenever the Comal springflow drops to some (as-yet)
undefined springf low or range of springf lows greater than 100
cfs." The court ordered FWS to specify and publish the minimum
springf lows and aquifer levels needed to prevent both "take" and
"jeopardy" of the five species at Comal and San Marcos Springs
and, further, to adopt and implement recovery plans adequate to
ensure that those levels would be met, even in a repeat of a
drought of record. The court also directed one state agency, the
Texas Water Commission, to prepare a plan to maintain the FWS
minimum springf low levels and invited the plaintiffs to seek
further relief if the State of Texas, whose legislature was then
its biennial session, did not soon have in effect a regulatory
system to limit withdrawals from the Edwards to meet ESA
requirements.
The newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, Bruce
Babbitt, decided to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiffs
through an amended judgment, rather than pursuing an appeal. The
Amended Judgment, entered on May 26, 1993, removed any reference
to FWS as the cause of the "take" of listed species, although the
court retained all of its findings that "take" of the species in
fact had occurred. The defendant-intervenors pressed their
appeal, which the Fifth Circuit dismissed, concluding that the
Amended Judgment did not bind those parties or have any
- 1 0 -
preclusive effect in future legal challenges. Sierra Club v. 
Babbitt 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993).
The final Amended Judgment and dismissal of the appeal, it
turned out, were not the end of the case, merely a way-station
for protracted post-judgment proceedings. The Texas Legislature
did enact legislation in 1993, creating the new Edwards Aquifer
Authority (EAA) to replace the EUWD and delegating powers to an
appointed board to regulate pumping from the aquifer. That
legislation was blocked from going into effect, however, because
the Department of Justice refused to preclear the law under the
federal Voting Rights Act, finding that the use of an appointed
board at the EAA to replace the elected members of the EUWD had
the effect of diminishing the voting rights of minority citizens.
The Sierra Club, meanwhile, moved for additional relief from
the district court, which appointed a monitor to draft new plans
to limit pumping, if needed to protect the species. The Sierra
Club also sought to amend its complaint, first to add new claims
against five federal agencies, including the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission, which was considering whether to close or
curtail operations at the four major military bases in San
Antonio which are the single largest source of jobs in the region
and which employ more Hispanics than any other employer in the
Southwest. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to expand
the scope of the litigation fully one year after final judgment,
but later did allow an amended complaint in April, 1995, to bring
new claims against the state TWC for failing to regulate pumping
while the fate of the EAA and EUWD were being resolved. The
Fifth Circuit overturned that ruling by writ of mandamus in June,
1995. The Texas Legislature by then had enacted corrective
legislation in May, 1995, to cure the voting Rights Act problem
by converting the EAA to an elected board. Before the EAA could
commence operations, however, a state court in Medina County
issued an injunction, concluding that the EAA legislation
violated the Texas Constitution on seven different grounds. An
appeal of that case is pending before the Texas Supreme Court.
The Sierra Club, meanwhile, continued to press for
additional relief from Judge Bunton throughout 1994 and 1995,
including the adoption by the court of new plans that would
regulate pumping from the aquifer, notwithstanding their earlier
representations to the Fifth Circuit that this ESA lawsuit was 	
(Th
limited to securing information from FWS, not establishing limits
on pumping by water users. By February, 1996, when FWS completed
its revised recovery plans for the five species, the Fifth
Circuit decided that it was time for this litigation to end, and
it ordered Judge Bunton to complete the ministerial actions
necessary to terminate the case, which he did on May 17, 1996.
Thus ends phase I. The Sierra Club already has filed a new
lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture under ESA 7,
seeking to compel formal consultation with FWS over the impact of
all USDA programs in the region and to enjoin crop subsidy
payments to farmers in Bexar, Medina, and Uvalde Counties. That
case is set for trial before Judge Bunton in July, 1996.
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The State of Texas has sued FWS in Waco, Texas, asserting
(similar to Sweet Home) that FWS and the Sierra Club have
misapplied the ESA § 9 definition of "harm" as a form of "take"
through habitat modification in connection with pumping from the
Edwards.
The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit against the National
Biological Service (NBS) in February, 1996, alleging the NBS
failed to comply with ESA § 7 consultation requirements by
proposing to close the San Marcos Hatchery and Technology Center,
which is used as a refugium for maintaining populations of the
ESA-listed species during period of low springf low and conducting
research on the biological requirements of the species. Judge
Bunton has entered a preliminary injunction requiring that
facility to continue existing operations, and the case is set for
trial on June 18, 1996.
The Sierra Club is expected to file new lawsuits in June,
1996, against pumpers and federal agencies to restrict their
pumping and any federal programs that support or allow pumping.
The state court litigation over the fate of the EAA and EUWD
was argued to the Texas Supreme Court in March, 1996, with a
decision expected later this year.
Somehow, the Texas blind salamander and its four ESA-listed
companions have hung on while the lawyers in Austin effectively
deforested the Pacific Northwest habitat of the northern spotted
owl by converting vast numbers of trees to paper on which the war
over the Edwards Aquifer water is being waged.
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II. The Endangered Species Act
The ruling by Judge Bunton in Sierra Club v. Babbitt that
FWS (or at least someone) violated ESA § 9 by committing an
unlawful "take" of fountain darters and other species raises a
number of questions regarding the evidentiary basis for proving a
"take." To say, as Judge Bunton did, that FWS "harmed" the
species by failing to provide sufficient information to the
people of Texas is an unusual application of that term. That
ruling occurred in early 1993, more than a year before the
Supreme Court's opinion in the Sweet Home case, which brought the
definition of "harm" as a form of "take" through habitat
modification into focus. I next examine the statutory and
regulatory provisions, then consider the manner in which other
Courts have applied the "take" definition under ESA § 9, citing
most of the leading, published decisions in the area.
- 14 -
A.	 The Section 9 Prohibition Against "Taking"
1. The Statutory "Take" Prohibition: Subject to limited
exceptions, "it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States jurisdiction to--* * * (B) take
endangered species within the United States or the territorial
sea of the United States; (C) take any such species on the high
seas; * * * or (G) violate any regulation pertaining to such
species...."
2. What Constitutes a "Take?":
a. The Statutory Definition of "Take" is to
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19).
b. The Regulatory Definition of "Harm" -- U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") regulations further define
"harm" to mean "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.
Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
c. The Regulatory Definition of "Harass" --
"Harass" is defined by FWS as "an intentional or negligent act or
omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal
behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to,
breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
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3.	 Exceptions to the "Take" Prohibition -- In several
instances, the ESA carves out exceptions to the prohibition
against the "take" of listed species. These include permits
issued by the Secretary for scientific research purposes or to
enhance propagation or survival of affected species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539 (a)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22. In addition, and of greater
interest, is the FWS's "incidental take" authority. In general,
FWS may permit taking that otherwise would be prohibited if the
taking is incidental to and not the purpose of carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity. This provision is designed to resolve
conflicts between development pressures and endangered species
protection. Any person may apply for permit. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B),
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22.
An applicant for incidental take permit must develop and
submit conservation plan that outlines: the impact that will
likely result from taking; steps applicant will take to minimize
and mitigate such impacts and funding available to implement such
steps; and alternative actions applicants considered and reasons
alternative are not being used. ESA § 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(2)(A).
The Secretary (FWS), after public comment, may grant a
permit if he finds that: the taking will be incidental; the
applicant will minimize and mitigate impacts of taking; the
applicant will ensure adequate funding for conservation plan will
be provided; and the taking will not appreciably reduce
likelihood of survival and recovery of species in the wild. ESA
- 16 -
§ 10(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Mt Graham
Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993); Friends of
Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.
1985).
B.	 Judicial Interpretations of "Take"'
1.	 Cases Findings Actions That Constitute a "Take"
a. Paula v. Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources, 471 F.Supp. 985 (D.Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Paula I) (action of state constituted
a taking where state permitted feral sheep and goats to destroy
habitat essential to endangered palila bird); 649 F. Supp. 1070
(D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II)
(upheld habitat modification portion of FWS's harm definition,
but ruled that state agency again committed "take").
b. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th
Cir. 1991), aff'd Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D.
Tex. 1988)(enjoined Forest Service timber practices following
documented dramatic decline in red-cockaded woodpecker colonies
directly traceable to lumbering practice); see also Sierra Club
v. Glickman,	 F.3d 	  (5th Cir. 1995)(emphasizing nature of
judicial review of "take" and "jeopardy" claims).
3 For a thoughtful analysis of ESA § 9 "take" claims in
light of the Sweet Home ruling, see Steven P. Quarles, et al.,
Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife "Take" Under Section 9 
of the Endangered Species Act, 26 Env't L. Rep. 10003-17 (Jan.
1996). Mr. Quarles and his co-authors of that article
represented the timber industry respondents in Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995), and
their analysis, while comprehensive, should be read in that
light.
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c. Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA,
882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989), att i c! in part, rev'cr in part, 668
F.Supp. 1334 (D.Minn. 1988)(EPA registration of strychnine for
use as rodenticide held a "take" where necessary pre-condition
for use leading to secondary poisoning of ESA-listed species).
d. Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297
(9th dr. 1991) (habitat destruction leading to individual owl
deaths may constitute "take" under ESA, but not under Migratory
Bird Treaty Act).
e. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (ESA "take" prohibitions apply to on-reservation
hunting activities of Indians where chief shot and later consumed
endangered Florida panther).
f. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation
Dist., 788 F.Supp. 1126 (E.D.Cal. 1992) (order permanently
enjoining water district from diverting water through defective
intake pipes that resulted in death of endangered Sacramento
River winter-run chinook salmon).
g. Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber
Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing citizen suit to
challenge to harm regulation based on prospect of imminent threat
to northern spotted owl).
h. Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880
F.Supp. 1343 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 27, 1995), aff'd, No. 95-16504 (9th
Cir. May 7, 1996) (enjoining timber harvest found to result in
- 18 -
"take" of marbled murrelet nesting habitat, including future
"harm" resulting from habitat modification which significantly
impairs breeding behavior of nesting birds).
2.	 Cases Where Actions Did Not Constitute "Take"
a. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. 
United States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990)
(evidence did not establish that diversion of water actually
caused spawning problems for endangered cui-ui fish species)
b. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163
(1st dr. 1993) (no violation absent evidence that deer hunt on
state lands actually caused harm to bald eagles).
c. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R.,
23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994) (corn spilled by railroad on tracks
in grizzly bear habitat was localized in nature and did not cause
significant habitat modification or impact).
d. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park
Service, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987) (insufficient evidence
of injury to establish "take" from National Park Service plan
designed to reduce conflicts between humans and grizzly bear at
Yellowstone campsite).
e. Morrill v. Lulan, 802 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.Ala.
1992) (habitat modification caused by beach development did not
constitute "harm" to Perdido Key beach mouse because no showing
that actual injury would occur to mouse).
f. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th
dir. 1993) (9th dir. 1993) (court construed term "harass" under
fl	 - 19 -
Marine Mammal Protection Act not to include "reasonable steps" to
deter porpoise from "normal behavior" of eating fish or bait off
fisherman's line).
III. The Supreme Court's Sweet Home Opinion
On June 29, 1995, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt,
115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995), upholding the facial validity of the FWS
regulation defining "harm" as a form of "take" under ESA 9.
The case did not involve the application of that regulation or
the definition of "harm" to any particular set of circumstances,
but instead "whether the Secretary exceeded his authority under
the Act by promulgating the regulation." 115 S.Ct. at 2409. As
a result, while the Court upheld the regulation as a valid
interpretation, the majority opinion, reflecting the views of six
Justices, concluded that the "difficult questions of proximity
and degree" of harm resulting from particular actions "must be
addressed in the usual course of the law, through case-by-case
adjudication." Id. at 2418.
The Court found that the ESA's text provided three reasons
to uphold the Secretary's and FWS's interpretation, id. at 2412,
namely that harm "means an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification
or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
- 20 -
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breeding, feeding, or sheltering." Id. at 2410, citing 50 C.F.R
N 17.3.
First, the ordinary, dictionary definition of "harm" is "'to
cause hurt or damage to: injure.'" Id. at 2412. "In the context
of the ESA, that definition naturally encompasses habitat
modification that results in actual injury or death to members of
endangered or threatened species." Id. at 2412-13. The Court
rejected the dissent's proposition that Congress intended to
limit "harm" to "direct applications of force against protected
species." Id. at 2413.
Second, "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the
Secretary's decision to extent protection against activities that
cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid."
Id., citing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978)(discussing comprehensive nature of statutory protection).
Given that broad congressional purpose, the Court found the
Secretary's regulation to be reasonable. Id. at 2414.
Third, the legislative history surrounding 1982 amendments
to the ESA confirmed that Congress understood ESA 9 to prohibit
"indirect as well as deliberate takings."	 Id. While the FWS
regulatory definition of "harm" may not have been compelled as
the only reasonable interpretation of the ESA 9 "take" term,
the Court found it to be a permissible interpretation deserving
judicial deference. Id. at 2416.
Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the majority opinion,
wrote separately to emphasize her two understandings that, first,
"the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat
modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or
speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals."
Id. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Second, even setting
aside difficult questions of scienter, the regulation's
application is limited by ordinary principles of proximate
causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability." Id.
The concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor raises several
examples worth noting, in terms of applying the concept of
proximate causation from tort law to the ESA § 9 context. These
examples, however, are not so easy to reconcile. First, she
indicates that a landowner who drains a pond on his/her property,
killing endangered fish in the process, likely would commit an
unlawful take. Similarly, to raze the last remaining breeding
ground of the piping plover, precluding reproduction and injuring
the individual living bird, would constitute a take in her view.
In contrast, she finds it inconceivable that a farmer whose
fertilizer is lifted by a tornado, as an intervening event, and
deposited in a distant wildlife refuge, killing or injuring
protected species, would be liable, given the attenuated nature
of the causal link between farming and the resultant death to the
species. Yet those facts arguably are no more implausible than
EPA's decision to continue the registration of strychnine, which
farmers then applied to kill rodents, some of whom were later
consumed by bald eagles. The Eighth Circuit upheld the finding
that EPA improperly committed a "take" in that case. Similarly,
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Justice O'Connor questions whether a farmer who tills a field,
(Th	 causing erosion that leads silt to run-off into a river,
depleting oxygen and injuring protect fish, would commit a take
because the chain of causal events is not foreseeable. Yet, that
type of scenario -- habitat modification through farming,
forestry, and grazing -- is commonly recognized by biologists as
one of the principal sources of threats to endangered Snake River
salmon. As both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion conclude, these difficult determinations are
best left to individual case adjudication and are not susceptible
to broader regulatory findings.
IV. Lessons of Sweet Home for the Edwards Aquifer
As discussed above, Judge Bunton's initial finding in Sierra
Club v. Babbitt was that FWS had committed an unlawful take in
violation of ESA 9 by failing to identify and publish for the
benefit of water users the minimum springf lows and aquifer water
levels required to protect the five ESA-listed species. At the
same time, he implied, in what must be considered obiter dictum,
that excessive human pumping was the principal cause of the
actual "harm" that he found had occurred to fountain darters and
other protected species. Any future challenge alleging that a
"take" of Edwards-dependent species, however, must be examined in
light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Sweet Home.
As an evidentiary matter, the Court's opinions make clear
that any application of the "harm" definition through habitat
modification must be based upon proof of "actual death or injury"
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to specific, identifiable individual animals. At the first
Edwards trial, there was no such proof, only testimony from some•
biologists that fountain darters (no more than one inch long)
appeared "thin" when removed from Comal Springs in 1989 and 1990.
No one testified as to discovery of a single dead or injured
fountain darter. That type of proof might be required to satisfy
the Supreme Court, based on the Sweet Home opinions. Whether,
and to what extent, modification of the Comal Springs habitat
could prove sufficient likely will receive its first test this
month, as the Sierra Club is expected to seek file new actions
against pumpers and move for injunctive relief to limit water
withdrawals.
Another significant result of Sweet Home in the Edwards
Aquifer context will be the emphasize on proximate cause. Many
pumpers are far removed from the springs by 50-70 miles, and
hydrologic evidence suggests that water moves slowly and in
undefined patterns underground. Whether a plaintiff could prove
that farmers in Uvalde and Medina Counties commit a "take" by
withdrawing water for irrigation, resulting in the death or
injury of a fountain darter at Comal Springs, poses at least a
challenging evidentiary obstacle. Moreover, the Court emphasized
the foreseeability of the action in terms of its impact on the
species. Does the fact that the Sierra Club put all pumpers on
notice as to its legal theory of causation provide sufficient
evidence of foreseeability to hold a pumper liable? Further,
given the fact that several thousand wells pump from the aquifer,
- 24 -
how does one attribute the take liability to any one pumper or
flgroup? Perhaps by class action? Finally, can drought be
considered an intervening event, like the tornado? Or is it so
commonplace in areas such as San Antonio that all are presumed to
be aware of its existence and treat it as part of the
environmental baseline?
I expect to have at least some initial answers to these
questions before the end of the Summer of 1996, unless Mother
Nature once again comes to the rescue by providing unexpected,
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1965 623,500 266,100 186,582 194 123,000 96
1966 615,200 255,900 192,966 197 111,400 109
1967 466,500 341,300 131,042 42 77,650 78
1968 884,700 251,700 231,384 254 143,100 137
1969 610,500 307,500 210,543 201 117,800 122
1970 661,600 329,400 221,173 250 144,600 152
1971 925,300 406,800 156,975 92 91,830 94
1972 756,400 371,300 225,124 242 116,700 128
1973 1,485,500 310,403 279,239 312 158,200 159
1974 658,500 377,400 275,377 294 133,800 140
1975 973,000 327,800 286,183 350 170,100 174
1976 894,100 349,500 268,906 308 153,200 121
1977 952,000 380,600 282,831 326 161,600 .	 126
1978 502,500 431,800 233,488- 226 87,420 100
1979 1,117,800 391,500 287,724 338 144,900 135
1980 406,400 491,100 206,350 184 95,960 111
1981 1,448,400 387,100 228,686 270 131,000 117
1982 422,400 453,100 198,127 201 93,470 112
1983 420,100 418,600 171,102 171 106,300 108
1984 '	 197,900 529,800 91,087 26 72,340 64
1986 1,003,300 522,500 184,463 184 132,030 120
1986 1,153,700 429,300 209,808 226 145,500 156
1987 2,003,800 364,100 264,606 317 183,500 182
1988 355,500 540,000 200,598 209 102,000 113
1989 214,400 542,400 117,433 62 72,530 80
1990 1,123,200 489,400 129,536 46 82,570 81
SOURCES: TOTAL ANNUAL RECHARGE - BULLERDI 50,13UWD, PREPARED BY USN (ALL YEARS)
	 KEY: PIA POT AVAILABLE
TOTAL ANNUAL PUMPAGE - BULLETIN EUWD, PREPARED BY USGS (ALL YEARS)
	 *ZERO FLOW FROM JUNE 13 - NOVEMBER)
COMM. SPRINGS TOTAL ANNUAL FLOWS - YEARS 1934-44 - URS0ORREST AND COTTON (1975)
	 "PARTIAL RECORD FOR 1956 MAY THROUGH
COMAL SPRINGS ',MAL ANNUAL PLOWS - YEARS 1945-90 - H. D. STEMLESS, SUPERVISORY HYDROCIECHDGIST. 	 DECEMBER DATA USED
WATER RESOURCE; MUNCH, USGS, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
COMAE SPRINGS TOTAL ANNUAL FLOWS - YEAR 1990 - EUWD BULLEI1N 30 AND USOS PROVISIONAL DATA
COMAL SPRINGS MINIMUM DAILY FLOW - 1945-89 - STEPHENS, USGS (SEE ABOVE)
(DM AL SPRINGS MINIMUM DAILY FLOW - YEAR 1990- EUWD BULLETIN 30 AND USGS PROVISIONAL DATA
SAN MARODS SPRINGS ToTAL ANNUAL FLOWS - YEARS 1934-56 - URWFORR EST AND maim (1975)
SAN M AR ( IM SPRINGS ITYIAL ANNUAL FLOWS - YEARS 1957-89 - USGS WATER DATA REPORTS
%AN msRit E. slit 1 Mis 10 I AL ANNUAL VI I /WS - YEAR 1990 - USGS WATER DATA REPORT AND USE'S PROVISIONAL DATA
SAN MARI Us SPRINGS MINIMUM DAILY MOW - YliARS 1958-89 - USGS WATER DATA REPORTS
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